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N/A: The Fifth Circuit: New History for an Old Problem--Jury Selection

THE FIFTH CIRCUIT: NEW HISTORY FOR AN OLD
PROBLEM-JURY SELECTION
INTRODUCTION

In an attempt to bring order into the area of jury selection, the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals convened en banc last year to decide six state
and federal cases1 involving various aspects of alleged discrimination by
jury commissioners. This Note shall analyze the principles set forth in those
six decisions in the following manner. First, the historical federal case
background from Strauder v. West Virginia2 to Swain v. Alabama8 will be
developed. This development will trace state exclusion based on race or
color.4 Next, the six decisions of the Fifth Circuit will be carefully
1 Brooks v.
United States,
F.2d 698 (5th
criminal case;

Beto, 366 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1966) (state criminal case); Rabinowitz v.
366 F.2d 34 (5th Cir. 1966) (federal criminal case); Labat v. Bennett, 365
Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 35 U.S.L. WEEK 3355 (U.S. Apr. 11, 1967) (state
habeas corpus proceeding); Davis v. Davis, 361 F.2d 770 (5th Cir. 1966)

(state criminal case; habeas corpus proceeding); Billingsley v. Clayton, 359 F.2d 13 (5th
Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 841 (1967) (class action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964))
Scott v. Walker, 358 F.2d 561 (5th Cir. 1966) (state criminal case; habeas corpus pro.
ceeding).
2 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
3 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
4 There has been very little Supreme Court activity in the area of state discrimination
based on factors other than race or color. The principal case is Hernandez v. Texas, 347
U.S. 475 (1954), where the Court recognized that the exclusion of a class of persons from
jury service on the basis of nationality deprived a criminal defendant who was a member
of that class of the constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws. The Court
found that a prima fade case had been established by the petitioner, a Mexican, when
he introduced evidence showing that Mexicans were a class constituting a substantial
segment of the population of the jurisdiction, that some of these Mexicans were quailfled to serve as jurors, and that none had been called for jury service. Furthermore, this
prima fade case was not overcome by mere words of denial of discrimination by the
jury commissioners. While pointing out that the existence of a class could be proven by
showing the attitude of the community, the Court established the following test:
When the existence of a distinct class is demonstrated, and it is further shown that
the laws, as written or as applied, single out that class for different treatment not
based on some reasonable classification, the guarantees of the Constitution have been
violated.
Id. at 478.
Although there have been no Supreme Court decisions directly concerning state exclusion of persons from juries on the basis of sex or religion, there has been some activity
in these areas by lower courts. The latest developments in these two areas are best
typified by White v. Crook, 251 F. Supp. 401 (M.D. Ala. 1966) and Schowgurow v. Mary.
land, 240 Md. 121, 213 A.2d 475 (Ct. App. 1965). In White, a three judge district court
held unconstitutional, under the fourteenth amendment, Alabama's statute barring
women from serving as jurors. This decision conforms with the gradual liberalizing
trend, manifest on both the federal and state levels, to increase the role of women In
jury service. E.g., Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187 (1946) (federal court supervisory
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examined. Finally, the results of those decisions will be explored for their
present and future significance with regard to the validity of "good-faith"
defenses interposed by jury commissioners against a prima fade case of
discrimination, the constitutionality of state inclusion of Negroes on grand
jury lists, and the legality of the federal "key-man" jury selection method.
STATE EXCLUSION BASED ON RACE OR COLOR

A. State Statutory Exclusion
The first jury selection problem faced by the federal courts under the

fourteenth amendment involved the question of whether states could
statutorily require all persons subject to jury service to be white. This
question was resolved in Strauder v. West Virginia.5 The plaintiff, a
Negro, was indicted for murder by an all white grand jury. State law
provided that only "white male persons" could serve as jurors. Proper
motions, both before and during trial, seeking removal of the case to a
federal circuit court were overruled by the state court. Plaintiff was then

convicted and the case was eventually appealed to the United States
Supreme Court. Relying upon the purpose of the fourteenth amendment,
the Court held that the plaintiff had a constitutional right to a trial of an
indictment against him by a jury selected and impaneled without dis-

crimination against his race or color.

This constitutional right of the criminal defendant was also extended
to include the selection and impaneling of petit juries.0 In addition, the
duty to protect this right was recognized to be the responsibility of the
state courts where removal of the case to a federal court was procedurally
impossible. 7 Thus, by 1900, express state statutory racial discrimination
was dearly violative of a criminal defendant's constitutional rights.8
power); Glasser v. United States, 315 US. 60 (1942) (federal court supervisory power);
see generally, The Jury System in the Federal Courts, 26 F.R.D. 411 (1960) (hereinafter
described as Report); Note, Jury Service for Women, 12 U. FLA. L. Rzv. 224 (1959). In
the Schowgurow case, the court held that its state constitutional provision that no person
shall be deemed incompetent as a juror on account of religious belief provided he
believes in the existence of God has been rendered unconstitutional by Torcaso v.
Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961). For subsequent development as to the problem of retroactivity of Schowgurow, see Schiller v. Lelkowitz, 242 Md. 461, 219 A.2d 378 (Ct. App.)
cert. denied, 385 US. 947 (1966); Hays v. State, 240 Md. 482, 214 A.2d 573 (Ct. App. 1965).
5 See note 2, suPra.
6 Bush v. Kentucky, 107 U.S. 110 (1882).
7 Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1881).
8 The Supreme Court, however, in Rawlins v. Georgia, 201 U.S. 638 (1906), has
evidenced a willingness to uphold the constitutionality of statutory exclusion not based
on race or color. In Rawlins petitioners were indicted for murder, tried and found
guilty. They appealed from this conviction and directly challenged the state's exemptions of certain classes from jury duty. The Court upheld the state's power to exempt
under the following analysis:
The nature of the classes excluded was not such as was likely to affect the conduct
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B. Total Exclusion by State Agents
No sooner was statutory discrimination laid to rest than a new problem

arose to challenge the Court. Certain state jury commissioners, undeterred
by the results of Strauder v. West Virginia and later cases, continued to
discriminate against Negroes through misapplication of state laws nondiscriminatory upon their face. Hence, the Court found it necessary to
consider evidence as to the actual practices of the jury commissioners. No
longer could the Court rely solely on the construction of applicable state
laws to determine the presence of discrimination.
In two early cases, Tarrance v. Florida9 and Martin v. Texas, 10 allegations of jury commissioner discrimination were dismissed because of the
failure of petitioners to introduce evidence other than their own sworn
affidavits. However, in Norris v. Alabama,1 this evidentiary hurdle was

successfully overcome, Petitioner, one of nine Negroes convicted of rape,
introduced in support of his contention of systematic and arbitrary exclusion of qualified Negro citizens from service on juries the following
evidence: 1930 United States census figures, jury book records for the
years 1930 to 1933, and the testimony of long time residents, the court
reporter, the clerk of the circuit court, and the clerk of the jury comof the members as jurymen, or to make them act otherwise than those who were
drawn would act. The exclusion was not the result of race or class prejudice. It
does not even appear that any of the defendants belonged to any of the excluded
classes. The ground of omission no doubt was that pointed out by the state court,
that the business of the persons omitted was such that either they would have been
entitled to claim exemption or that probably they would have been excused. Even
when persons liable to jury duty under the state laws are excluded it is not ground
for challenge to the array, if a sufficient number of unexceptionable persons are
present . . . . But if the state law itself should exclude certain classes on the
bona fide ground that it was for the good of the community that their regular work
should not be interrupted, there is nothing in the Fourteenth Amendment to
prevent it. The exemption of lawyers, ministers of the gospel, doctors, and engineers of railroad trains, in short substantially the exemption complained of, Is
of old standing and not uncommon in the United States. It could not be denied
that the State properly could have excluded these classes had it seen fit ....
Id. at 640.
The main thrust of this analysis seems to be that the state is entitled to weigh the
public benefit of excluding or exempting certain classes from jury duty against the
fourteenth amendment's provisions. In effect, the defendant's constitutional right to
freedom from' discrimination in the selection of the juries to indict and try him can be
waived by the state for the benefit of the public good.
Since the Rawlins decision, a haphazard enactment of state exemptions at a rapid
rate has occurred which are nominally justified as being for the public benefit. In many
cases, however, it would seem that the exemptions are actually for the benefit of only
the particular class involved. See Note, 52 VA. L. REV. 1069, 1074-75 (1966).
9 188 U.S. 519 (1903).
10 200 U.S. 316 (1906).
11 294 U.S. 587 (1935).
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mission. In reply the state made unsupported general assertions that no
Negro in the area had the requisite qualifications for jury service. Finding
that the petitioner had established a prima fade case of denial of equal
protection, the Court stated:
We think that the evidence that for a generation or longer no negro
had been called for service on any jury in Jackson County, that there
were negroes qualified for jury service, that according to the practice
of the jury commission their names would normally appear on the
preliminary list of male citizens of the requisite age but that no names
of negroes were placed on the jury roll, and the testimony with respect
to the lack of appropriate consideration of the qualifications of negroes, established the discrimination which the Constitution forbids. 2
Thus, the Court established the procedural concept of (1) requiring that
the petitioner establish a prima fade case of discriminations and then
(2) delegating to the state the burden of going forward with the evidence
to show a lack of intentional discrimination.1 4 General statements as to
the lack of qualified Negroes did not overcome petitioner's prima fade
case. This concept was subsequently recognized in Pierre v. Louisiana.15
It was also amplified in Hill v. Texas,16 when the Court equated failure
by jury commissioners to ascertain whether there were "within the county
members of the colored race qualified to serve as jurors, and if so who they
17
were" with intentional discrimination.
C. Token Inclusion by State Agents
The next problem confronting the Supreme Court arose from the
response of certain jury commissioners to the duty delegated to them by
Norris to ascertain the qualifications of Negroes in their areas. Rather
than actively determine these qualifications, these jury commissioners
attempted to include a token number of Negroes on their grand jury or
12

Id. at 596.

For an analysis of the burden of proof upon petitioner, see Witcher v. Peyton, 261
F. Supp. 1018, 1020-23 (W.D. Va. 1966).
13

14

But see Anderson v. Johnson, 371 F.2d 84 (6th Cir. 1966) (state criminal case; habeas

corpus proceeding). Despite the establishment of a prima fade case of total exclusion of
Negroes from service on both grand and petit juries, the court appears to hold that

neither the use of peremptory challenges nor the excusing of summoned Negro jurors
from service upon their own application and for cause constituted acts of intentional
discrimination. The conflict in the evidence below, which existed because of the
presence of an affidavit submitted by an interested judge denying the existence of any

discrimination, found by the Sixth Circuit appears to be essentially similar to that in
Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398 (1945)-a prima fade case countered by a general denial.
15 306 U.S. 354 (1939).
16 316 US. 400 (1942).
17 Id. at 404.
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petit jury rolls. This action led to a number of cases in which the records
introduced by petitioner showed that one or two Negro names consistently
appeared on the jury lists year after year. In Smith v. Texas, 8 the Court
struck down this type of token inclusion as unconstitutional with the
following comment:
Chance and acident alone could hardly have brought about the listing
for grand jury service of so few negroes from among the thousands
shown by the undisputed evidence to possess the legal qualifications
for jury service. Nor could chance and accident have been responsible
for the combination of circumstances under which a negro's name,
when listed at all, almost invariably appeared as number 16, and under
which number 16 was never called for service unless it proved impos.
sible to obtain the required jurors from the first 15 names on the list. 19
In this case, Negroes were shown to have constituted over twenty percent
of the population and almost ten percent of the poll tax payers while
only a fraction of one percent had ever served during an eight-year period.
A few years later, however, the Court's decision in Akins v. Texas20
appeared to limit the doctrine established in Smith. In Akins the Court
affirmed a state court holding that discrimination had not been proved.
Despite the repeated assertions of the jury commissioners during the state
proceedings that they had intentionally placed a few Negro names on
their jury lists specifically to provide representation for the Negroes in
their area, the Court held itself bound by the lower court's findings
because of conflict in the evidence presented below. From the Court's
opinion it appears that the conflict in evidence was' merely the conflict
between the general assertions of the jury commissioners as to the lack
of intentional discrimination and the statistical and testimonial proof of
petitioner as to the disproportionately few Negroes on the jury lists as
compared with the number of qualified Negroes available. This type of
conflict had previously been resolved in favor of the petitioner by the
Court. 21 Although there has been no express recognition of this shift in
approach by Akins in later cases, subsequent holdings indicate that this
22
attitude has been re-established.
18 311 U.S. 128 (1940).
19 Id. at 131.
20 825 U.S. 398 (1945).
21 E.g., Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400 (1942); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940), Norris
v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935).
22 E.g., Arnold v. North Carolina, 376 U.S. 773 (1964); Avery v. Georgia, $45 U.S. 559
(1953). But cf. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965). In Avery, the Court observed:

[E]ven if the white [denoting whites] and yellow [denoting Negroes] tickets were
drawn from the jury box without discrimination, opportunity was available to

resort to it at other stages in the selection process.
345 U.S. at 562. Therefore, just the opportunity for discrimination was enough to over-
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For example, in 1950 the Court held in Cassell v. Texas-3 that the
failure of the jury commissioners conscientiously to determine what Negroes were qualified in their area invalidated the indictment against
petitioner. The evidence showed that Negro representation on the grand
juries of Dallas County during a prescribed six-year period had been six
and seven-tenths percent as compared to the fact that qualified Negroes
constituted fifteen and five-tenths percent of the total population. Of
come presumption of lack of discrimination in the selection of jurors by the local jury
commissioners.
A second interesting aspect in Avery, discussed in the concurring opinion of Mr.
Justice Frankfurter, is the Court's willingness to find a prima fade case of discrimination on the basis of the lack of Negroes on the single panel of sixty directly invoh'ed.
Id. at 562. Mr. Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion appears to depart from the
reasoning of an earlier Supreme Court decision, Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U.S. 463
(1947). There the Court overruled the Mississippi Supreme Court's determination that
petitioner had failed to prove systematic racial discrimination with the following explanation:
. . . [The Mississippi Supreme Court] erroneously considered only the fact that no
Negroes were on the particular venire lists from which the juries were drawn that
indicted and convicted petitioner. It regarded as irrelevant the key fact that for
thirty years or more no Negro had served on the grand or petit juries. This omission seriously detracts from the weight and respect that we would otherwise give to
its conclusion in reviewing the facts, as we must in a constitutional question like
this. (Emphasis added.)
Id. at 466. If it is a serious mistake to determine lack of discrimination on the basis of
a single venire list, it might appear to be just as serious a mistake to determine the
presence of discrimination on the basis of a single venire list. While petitioner is
ultimately attempting to prove intentional discrimination in the selection process of the
jury or juries which heard his case, the relatively small number of persons on the venire
list and the grand and petit juries chosen would generally not seem to be significant
enough for reliable statistical analysis. See Finkelstein, The Application of Statistical
Decision Theory to the Jury Discrimination Cases, 80 HI- v. L. Rzv. 338, 3-49-53 (1966).
In Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545, 552 (1967), however, the Court once again used a
single venire list, this time composed of ninety names, to determine the presence of
discrimination. Perhaps the answer to the deviation of Avery and Whitus from the rest
of the Supreme Court decisions involving statistical analyses, which have been determined only after a study of evidence covering a significant number of jury lists and
juries, is that the Court was influenced by the dear possibilities for discrimination
available under the Georgia selection processes which used segregated source lists.
Otherwise a double standard arises. Under Patton v. Mississippi, lack of discrimination
may not be determined on the basis of a single venire list, while under Whitus the
presence of discrimination may be determined on the basis of a single venire list.
In light of Patton v. Mississippi, the recent Georgia case, Sims v. State, 221 Ga. 190
(1965), remanded on other grounds, 385 U.S. 538 (1967), is probably incorrect. There the
Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's exclusion of all proffered jury
lists for a ten-year period except those lists from which the actual juries which indicted
and convicted were chosen. It then found that petitioner had not sustained his burden
of proving intentional discrimination on these specific juries. This is exactly the procedure criticized in Patton v. Mississippi.
23 339 U.S. 282 (1950).
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twenty-one grand juries, seventeen hAd had exactly one Negro juror.
Despite the jury commissioners' testimony that there had been no intentional discrimination against Negroes based on their color, the Court
reversed the state court's findings. Therefore, it now seems well established
that token inclusion-at least inclusion not based upon any actual factual
basis-is unconstitutional,
D. Disproportionate(but more than token) Number of Negroes on Jury
or Jury List when Compared with Total Number of Negroes or Qualifled Negroes in Community
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that a defendant is not entitled
to an exact proportional representation of his class upon the grand jury
or petit jury determining his case.24 On the other hand, as indicated by the
preceding analysis, the defendant is entitled to have a jury chosen without
discrimination based upon race or color. The most recent problem to
come before the Supreme Court has involved cases in which enough names
of qualified Negroes appeared on the jury lists in question to eliminate
clear indication of complete exclusion or token inclusion, but not enough
names appeared to prevent a consistent disproportionate balance between
these names and the total number of qualified Negroes in the community.
Faced with the need for balancing the rights of the defendant against the
practical difficulties of obtaining fair representation upon initial jury
lists, the Court has not always been completely consistent or clear in its
results.
For example, careful examination of the Akins case leaves unclear the
question of whether the Court would allow intentional inclusion of Negroes on a grand jury provided the inclusion Was approximately proportional to the number of Negroes eligible for grand jury service. Although
the Court, in the Cassell case, stated:
If, notwithstanding this caution by the trial court judges, commissioners should limit proportionally the number of Negroes selected
for grand-jury service, such limitation would violate our Constitution."
The actual holding of that case was not founded upon that basis but
rather upon the following:
Our holding that there was discrimination in the selection of grand
jurors in this case, however, is based on another ground. In explaining
the fact that no Negroes appeared on this grand-jury list, the commissioners said that they knew none available who qualified, at the
same time they said they chose jurymen only from those people with
24 E.g., Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965); Strauder v. West Virginia,

100 U.S.

303 (1880).
25 Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 286 (1950).
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whom they were personally acquainted .... When the commissioners
were appointed as judicial administrative officials, it was their duty
to familiarize themselves fairly with the qualifications of the eligible
jurors of the county without regard to race and color. They did not
do so here, and the result has been racial discrimination."
Therefore, the Supreme Court has not yet directly ruled upon an intentional attempt by a state to proportion its juries or jury lists according
to factual or statistical census data.
Nonetheless, certain guidelines have appeared, and, in some cases, seem
to have increased the burden of proof oil the petitioner. In Brown v.
Allen,2 7 the Court held that the use of tax lists-both property and poll
tax-were valid sources for determining names for a state jury list. It
also dismissed as inadequate petitioner's proof that fewer Negroes than
whites, having regard for their proportion of the population, appeared
on the jury panels. This necessarily implies that petitioner must prove the
disparity between the number of Negroes on the lists, panels, or juries and
the number of legally qualified Negroes in the community. Earlier decisions
had not always made this point dear-perhaps because it was not necessary
in light of the total exclusion or unfounded token inclusion there involved.
One of the most recent decisions, Swain v. Alabama,28 establishes a permissible margin of under-representation and clearly highlights the difficulty
of proving intentional discrimination where there is substantial representation of Negroes on the jury lists. Here, the evidence showed that qualified
Negro males made up tventy-six percent of all males in the county, but
that only ten to fifteen percent of the grand and petit jury panels drawn
from the jury box in twelve years had been Negroes. Furthermore, from
one to three Negroes had served on eighty percent of the grand juries
actually selected. However, no Negro had served on a petit jury since
1950. In the particular case before the Court, eight Negroes had been on
the petit jury venire but none actually served. Despite this evidence, the
Court held as follows:
We cannot say that purposeful discrimination based on race alone is
satisfactorily proved by showing that an identifiable group in a community is underrepresented by as much as 10%. ",
The Court also dismissed charges that the prosecution had used its
peremptory strikes to arbitrarily exclude all Negroes. This was done on
the ground that petitioner had not shown a continued practice of exclusion
of Negroes through the use of strikes by the prosecution alone.
2 Id. at 287-88, 289.
27 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
25 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
29 Id. at 208-09.
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Thus, Swain creates a practical problem of proof for the petitioner. The
scarcity of long-term, detailed jury selection and peremptory challenge
records kept by many, if not most, states may necessarily prevent a petitioner from being more precise with his evidence than the petitioner was
in Swain. Yet, in Swain the petitioner's evidence was not sufficient to
sustain his burden of proof in the face of the permitted margin of underrepresentation.

FROM ScoTr To

LABAT

The first case before the Fifth Circuit was Scott v. Walker. ° Petitioner,
a Negro, introduced evidence showing an apparent total exclusion of
Negroes from criminal petit juries in the area. Census figures for 1960
showed that qualified Negroes constituted thirteen percent of the total
of qualified persons in the community. No Negro had ever served on a
criminal petit jury in this area. One or two Negroes were selected for the
grand jury list, which consisted of three hundred names, at nearly every
drawing. However, only a few Negroes actually served on the grand jury.
One Negro did serve on the grand jury which indicted appellant. In
Louisiana, the petit jury is drawn from the same box from which the
grand jury is drawn. Respondent did not produce arty of the lists for the
previous four years in an effort to show the racial composition of the
petit jury panels.
Finding that the Louisiana selection system led to token inclusion of
Negroes on the grand jury while correspondingly greatly decreasing the
likelihood of a Negro's name ever being drawn for a venire of thirty for
an actual trial, the court held that a prima facie case had been established
by petitioner which was not overcome by the general denials of the respondent, especially in light of the failure to produce records indicating the
exact racial composition of the parish's panels and juries. Thus, the
disparity between the number of qualified Negroes (13% of the parish
population) and the number of Negroes whose names were on the petit
jury list (1% of the parish population) constituted a prima facie case of
discrimination.
In the second case, Billingsley v. Clayton,31 the Fifth Circuit heard a
class action 32 brought by Negro residents against the local jury board.
30 358 F.2d 561 (5th Cir. 1966). Note that only the petit jury was actually challenged

by petitioners in this case. The court's discussion of the selection of the grand jury is
solely for the purpose of supporting its findings concerning the petit jury selection
procedure.

31 359 F.2d 13 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 841 (1967).
32 The validity of a class action brought by prospective jurors who have been discriminated against under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964), has been established by the holdings of
three recent decisions. Turner v. Spencer, 261 F. Supp. 542 (S.D. Ala. 1966); White v.
Crook, 251 F. Supp. 401 (M.D. Ala. 1966); Mitchell v. Johnson, 250 F. Supp. 117 (M.D.

Ala. 1966). This recent development clearly indicates that a prospective juror has it
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These residents alleged that their constitutional rights had been violated
through the systematic exclusion of qualified Negroes from the county's
jury rolls. In compiling the jury rolls for both divisions in the county.
the jury board relied primarily on a house-to-house survey but sometimes
employed the telephone directory, city directory and tax records. It was
shown that twenty-nine percent of the qualified persons in the county
were Negro. Also, the record clearly indicated that Negroes had comprised,
at most, only ten pecent of those on the panels from which the petit
juries were chosen, and had rarely served on the petit juries.
Solely because the record indicated that the respondents had nothing
to do with the selection of jurors to serve on grand and petit juries after
their names were placed on tile jury rolls, the court dismissed the part
of the complaint charging the jury board with discrimination in that area
of the jury selection process. The court also found for the jury board on
the other charges despite the disparity between Negro names on their lists
and qualified Negroes in the community. Although the court recognized
that petitioners had established a prima fade case, it nevertheless believed
that the jury board had introduced enough evidence to prove that it had
exerted a good faith effort to gain Negro names for its lists. As the court
stated:

For reasons not apparent from the record, it is evident that a large
proportion of the Negro community is either uninterested in jury
service, or being interested, does not avail itself full) of the opportunity
to render jury service. 33
The cause of the disparity in the jury lists was thus blamed upon the class
itself rather than upon the jury board.
The result in Davis v. Davis,3 4 however, again indicated that the court
would require more than assertions of good faith to refute a prima fade
case of discrimination. In this instance, the disparity was approximately
fourteen and two-tenths percent for the supplementary lists prepared over
a two-year period. Further, the jury commissioners were unable to find a
single Negro on any of the introduced eleven petit jury lists of thirty
persons each. From this and other testimony of the jury commissioners,
the court readily determined that they had not fulfilled their constitutional
duty of familiarizing themselves with those Negroes who were qualified
and thus eligible for jury service.
constitutional right not to be arbitrarily excluded from the preparation of initial jury

lists. However, because of the nature of class actions and the right involved. it seemS
clear that petitioners would have to be members of the class alleged o have been
arbitrarily excluded.
33 Billingsley v. Clayton, 359 F.2d 13, 23 (5th Cir. 1966).
34 361 F.2d 770 (5th Cir. 1966).
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In Rabinowitz v. United Stales,35 the Court was concerned with a federal
criminal case. After deciding that petitioner, a white civil rights worker,
the court held that dishad standing to challenge exclusion of Negroes
35 366 F.2d 34 (5th Cir. 1966).
36 Whether actual membership in the class allegcdly being discriminated against is
a condition precedent for standing to sue is not completely clear. Some courts have held
or indicated by way of dictum that a criminal defendant cannot challenge the exclusion of a particular class from his jury unless he is a member of that class. E.g., Rawlins
v. Georgia, 201 U.S. 638, 640 (1906) (dictum); Alexander v. State, 160 Tex. Crint. 460,
274 SAV.2d 81, cert. denied, 348 U.S. 872 (1954). Other courts, however, have agreed
with the result reached in Rabinowitz v. United States, 366 F.2d 34 (5th Cir. 1966).
E.g., United States v. Hunt, 265 F. Supp. 178 (W.D. Tex. 1967); Allen v. State, 110 Ga, App.
56, 137 S.E.2d 711 (1964). In the Allen case, the Georgia Court of Appeals allowed a
white petitioner who had been involved in civil rights work to successfully challenge
the exclusion of Negroes from grand jury duty or traverse jury service. The court
asserted that:
The exclusionary practice condemned by the Fourteenth Amendment does not
depend upon the exclusion from juries of a group to which the defendant belongs
or identifies himself, but on the resulting failure of the jury to represent a cross
section of the community.
Id. at 59. The court then went on to state:
Furthermore, we cannot say as a matter of law that this defendant, who was active
in voter registration among Negroes, was not a member of a group systematically
excluded in selecting the grand and traverse juries....
Were it necessary for the defendant to show prejudice, judicial notice might be
taken where prejudice exists against the advocacy of the Negro's full privileges and
duties of citizenship, a white person active in promoting participation in government by Negroes would be the object of a strong adverse prejudice as would a
Negro engaged in such activities, and perhaps stronger.
Id. at 62-63. The question of whether the defendant must be a member of the class
excluded also may arise in cases concerning allegations of nonracial dliscrimination. In
Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954), the Court made the following general statement:
[I]t has been recognized since Strauder v. West Virginia . . . that the exclusion of a
class of persons from jury service on grounds other than race or color may also
deprive a defendant who is a member of that class of the constitutional guarantee
of equal protection of the laws.
(Emphasis added.) Id. at 477. Since the petitioner in Hernandez was a member of the
class excluded, the Court's statement may have been merely descriptive and not meant
to exclude defendants not a member of the class excluded from their constitutional
rights to a fairly chosen jury. Whatever the meaning, the lower federal courts have not
been consistent in their approach to the issue. One set of cases involve allegations by
males of systematic exclusions of women from the juries which considered their cases.
In Johnson v. Sanford, 167 F.2d 738 (1948) (state criminal case), the court held that the
Constitution did not entitle men to have women jurors. As the court pointed out,
"Women are not here claiming any discrimination against them either as jurors or de.
fendants." Id. at 739. Nevertheless, in two federal criminal cases, Alger v. United States,
171 F.2d 667 (7th Cir. 1948), and Wright v. United States, 165 F.2d 105 (8th Cir. 1918),
the courts considered the allegations made on their merits. Furthermore, in King v.
United States, 165 F.2d 408 (8th Cir. 1948), a state criminal case, the court asserted that
the
right to not have women intentionally and systematically excluded from a jury panel
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crimination had resulted from the jury commissioner's failure to contact
Negroes as sources of jurors or to otherwise gain qualified Negro names.
The commissioner's defense that he had attempted to obtain a more
"intelligent" jury list was invalidated by the court's holding that the
federal statutory qualifications 1 did not constitute minimum standards,

but rather delineated the sole standards for selection of jurors. Therefore,
attempts by federal jury commissioners to obtain jurors according to
intelligence or moral tests other than those specified in the federal statutes
were invalid.
In the fifth case, Brooks v. Beto,38 the Fifth Circuit overruled an earlier

deision3 9 to hold that it is not unconstitutional for jury commissioners
to purposefully include Negro names on initial jury lists so long as this
is done against a factual background showing a good faith effort to grant
Negro residents in a community proportional representation on these

initial lists. In fact, the court asserted that the constitutional duty of the
jury commissioner to find out the existing groups within his area and
to learn the names of the qualified members of that group necessarily
required him to consider the nature of that group in choosing qualified
names to go on his initial lists. The court specifically recommended two
possible ways that such jury selection could be done.
One, obviously, is fairly to place on the juror-selecting body persons
from or closely identifiable with such groups. The selectors thus serve
the dual role as selectors and as the source of indispensable information. Another, broadly, is the establishment of a more or less systemized procedure for contacting responsible members or organizations
is one that may be waived, and it will ordinarily be deemed to have been so
waived where timely objection is not made in the proceedings....
Ibid. Although the court eventually held against the petitioner, it appears to have
recognized that he had a constitutional right not to have had women excluded as a class
from his jury. Finally, in United States v. HoEa, 196 F. Supp. 25 (S.D. Fla. 1961), a
federal criminal case, the court directly upheld petitioner's challenge even though he
had not proven that he had been prejudiced by the exclusion of women (among several
classes excluded) from his grand jury.
A second set of cases involved federal charges of violations of the Smith Act. E.g.,
United States v. Flynn, 216 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 848 U.S. 909 (1955);
United States v. Foster, 83 F. Supp. 197 (S.D.N.Y. 1949). Petitioners challenged their
juries on the basis that Negroes, women, Jews, manual workers, indigents, and members
of the Communist Party had been systematically excluded. Although the courts held
against the petitioners, their allegations were apparently considered on their merits.
There were no court discussions of the fact that petitioners were not members of each
and every one of the classes they claimed had been excluded. Neither were there court
discussions about prejudice as a necessary basis for petitioners' challenges.
3 28 US.C. § 1861 (1964).
38 366 F.2d I (5th Cir. 1966).
39 Collins v. Walker, 329 F.2d 100 (5th Cir.), aff'd on rehearing, 335 F.2d 417, cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 901 (1964).
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within the class to obtain names or lists of names of those likely to be
40
available and qualified.
These recommendations amount to suggesting the use of some form of the
key-man system used in the federal court system.
The final case, Labat v. Bennett,41 involved an appeal from a habeas
corpus proceeding concerning a state criminal case which had at one time
been appealed to the United States Supreme Court in Michel v. Louisiana.4 2
First, the court held that the failure of the petitioners to make timely
challenge to the jury system at their initial trials did not bar them from
so challenging in a habeas corpus proceeding, in absence of an intentional
relinquishment of a known right and deliberate bypassing of a known
procedural requirement in the state court. It then found that the jury
selection staff carried on a deliberate policy of not selecting "daily wage
earners" because of its knowledge that the judges usually excluded these
persons on request because of the financial hardship jury duty imposed
upon them. Since the majority of these workers were Negroes, this exclusion led to a disparity of about twenty-eight percent on the final venire
lists. Despite the past history indicating a steady drain of Negroes via the
exclusion of daily wage earners, the jury selection staff apparently made
no effort to gain additional Negro names.
These facts led the court to rule that, in the absence of statutory

authority:
(A) The exclusion of daily wage earners as a class violates the petitioners' due process and equal protection rights to an impartial jury
representing a cross-section of the community. (B) The exclusion of
this large class, 47 percent of all Negro workers in Orleans Parish...
discriminates against Negroes in violation of the equal protection
clause

...

.43

The selection staff here committed two errors. First, it excluded a class
of workers, thus taking away these workers' individual rights to either
serve or ask for exclusion. Second, it failed to correct, by independent
gathering of other Negro names, the disparity in Negro names available
for jury service caused by the large loss of Negro daily wage earners.
44

THE FIFM CIRCUIT SiTs EN BANC

A. The "Good Faith" Defense
In Billingsley, the court recognized that a good faith effort to establish
representative juries constituted a valid defense for jury commissioners.
40
41
42
43
44

Brooks v. Beto, 366 F.2d 1, 23 (5th Cir. 1966).
365 F.2d 698 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 35 U.S.L. WzNK 3355 (U.S. Apr. 11, 1967).
350 U.S. 91 (1955).
Labat v. Bennett, 365 F.2d 698, 719-20 (5th Cir. 1966).
For an analysis in praise of the pragmatic approach of the Fifth Circuit in the
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Two features of this case should be noted. First, the action involved was
a class action brought by Negro residents of the county. Therefore, this
was not the usual situation where a criminal defendant convicted of a
crime has appealed his conviction on the ground that his jury or juries
has been unfairly chosen. Consequently, the Fifth Circuit was concerned
with only the prospective juror's rights under the Constitution, and not
with a criminal defendant's rights. Second, petitioners apparently failed
to include all responsible parties in their action, especially those in charge
of jury selection after the initial jury lists were prepared. This reduced
much of the court's opinion to the status of dicta aimed at those persons
who should have been co-respondents but who were not. But, despite these
differences from the usual jury discrimination case, the basic points established by the court are of substantial importance.
As developed by Billingsley and the other Fifth Circuit decisions, certain
elements of the good faith defense can be identified. First, the defense
4
requires repeated efforts by the jury board to gain qualified Negro names. 3
Second, the court still will not tolerate mere general denials of lack of
intent to discriminate in the absence of evidence showing an active attempt
to gain names. 4 6 The buden of introducing such evidence is upon the jury
47
Fourth,
board. Third, the court will not allow mere token inclusion.
intential discrimination need not be a question of subjective intent. Only
an intent by the jury board to do the act or acts done or not done seems
to be required.4 8 Thus, "honest" negligence or failure to secure qualified
names does not constitute a defense. However, intentional discrimination
still appears to demand some form of action-even if it is only the decision
not to act-by those involved. Discrimination caused by the inherent
random chance of the selection system used has not yet been declared
unconstitutional.
While the cases above concerned racial discrimination, the extension
of fourteenth amendment protection to discrimination of economic classes
in the Labat decision indicates that similar future development could take
place in cases involving allegations of discrimination based on factors other
49
than race or color.
following six cases, see Martin, The Fifth Circuit and Jury Selection Cases: The Negro
Defendant and His Peerless Jury, 4 Hous. L. REv. 448 (1966).
45 See Labat v. Bennett, 365 F.2d 698 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 35 U.SJL IVrnK
3355 (U.S. Apr. 11, 1967).
46 Davis v. Davis, 361 F.2d 770 (5th Cir. 1966).
47 Scott v. Walker, 358 F.2d 561 (5th Cir. 1966).
48 Davis v. Davis, 361 F.2d 770, 773 (5th Cir. 1966).
49 Future development in cases involving allegations of nonracial discrimination may
proceed relatively slowly since current interest in this matter seems to be primarily
focused upon racial discrimination. See generally, Tucker, Racial Discrimination in Juty

Selection in Virginia, 52 VA. L. Rxv. 736 (1966); Finkelstein, supra note 22; Martin,
supra note 44. However, the close connection which often exists between racial and
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B. State Inclusion of Negroes
The Fifth Circuit overruling of Collins v. Walkerr0 was an admission
on its part that holding a jury commissioner to a positive duty to see that
all identifiable classes within his area were not denied a chance to be
fairly represented on his jury lists was incompatible with this same jury
commissioner's not being able to consider race when placing qualified names
on his lists. Because of the importance of gaining a fairly representative
initial list of prospective jurors, the court finally decided to allow-if not
in fact require-state jury commissioners to include names of qualified
Negroes on their lists in order to insure that Negroes are fairly represented.
This first step may eventually lead to further steps to require such percentage representation of qualified Negroes and other classes on initial jury
lists which accurately reflect those class's proportional positions in the entire
community. Clearly such inclusion will have to be based upon accurate
statistical or other factual analyses of the class structure of the community
or such inclusion would fall directly under the rationale of Cassell v.
Texas.51
Such a requirement for inclusion may well be easy enough in considering
race or color, but expansion of this requirement to cover other classes
would undoubtedly call for clearer definition of the term "class," 5 2 a reevaluation of the number of classes and types of representation demanded
for a "fairly representative" jury in light of the practical difficulties in.
volved in learning all of the names of each class existing within the commissioner's area, 53 and the delineation of standards to be used in testing
the fairness of the percentaged lists prepared by commissioners under the
new Fifth Circuit requirements.
Although Brooks encourages inclusion of Negroes onto initial jury lists,
the scope of this encouragement with respect to subsequently prepared lists
prior to selection of the final jury panel from which actual grand or petit
juries will be chosen was not explicated. Under the facts of the Brooks
case, the jury commissioners were responsible for compiling a list of sixteen names from which twelve were to be finally chosen by the court for
actual grand jury duty. Unlike the more typical initial lists, the Texas
grand jury list required only four names to be excluded to arrive at the
social or economic factors, see Labat v. Bennett, 865 F.2d 698 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
35 U.S.L. WEEK 3355 (U.S. Apr. 11, 1967), may lead to faster progress than might otherwise be expected.
50 329 F.2d 100 (5th Cir. 1964).
51 339 U.S. 282 (1950). See text accompanying notes 23 and 15, supra.
52 See note 4, supra.
53 United States v. Duke, 263 F. Supp. 828, 837 (S.D. Ind. 1967); United States v.
Ware, 237 F. Supp. 849 (D.D.C. 1964), aff'd, 356 F.2d 787 (D.C. Cir. 1965), cert. denied,

383 U.S. 919 (1966); Report, supra note 4,at 469-75. Perhaps increased use of computers
could help solve some of these practical difficulties. (f., Report, supra, at 481.
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final jury to be used. Since Brooks approved of this example of inclusion,
the question naturally arises as to whether jury commissioners under more
normal jury selection plans may not be able, or perhaps even required, to
prepare fairly proportioned lists of qualified jurors through each phase
of elimination of names down to (1) the step immediately preceding the
actual selection of the grand jury, or (2) the petit jury panel ready for
challenging by the court and parties' attorneys. Under such a requirement.
disparities caused through exclusions by the court would be alleviated by
corrective action along each one of the steps of jury selection.

While the Fifth Circuit has not yet gone this far,"4 it would seem to be
the next logical advancement to protect both the criminal defendant's and
theprospective juror's constitutional right not to be discriminated against
in the selection of juries. Of course, this could become an attack upon the
random chance factor inherent in the processes of all of the jury selection
systems presently being practiced, and no longer a mere correction of
intentional human discrimination. The rate of speed at which such an
extension could meaningfully proceed would be dependent upon the
progress achieved by the Fifth Circuit in answering the three problems
described at the beginning of this section. 5 Such progress will itself depend
upon the willingness of the lower district courts to understand and cope
with the problems involved.
C. The Key-man System
In the midst of declaring constitutional inclusion of qualified names of
Negroes on initial jury lists on the basis of race or color, the court in
Brooks also recommended two methods of determining the number of
qualified names in the classes within the commissioner's area of responsibility. Both methods were equivalent to the method known as the key-man
system used in the federal courts by federal jury commissioners. Therefore,
it would seem that the key-man system is not only constitutional, but also
a preferable way to carry out jury selection. But can this attitude be
reconciled with the position of the Fifth Circuit in the Rabinowitz case?
In that case, the court interpreted the federal statute setting the qualifications for prospective federal jurors to be the sole standards applicable.
If this is the actual meaning of Rabinowitz, then much of the discretion
required under the key-man jury selection method is removed since the
reference men no longer should be able to suggest names of prospective
jurors on the basis of any qualifications other than those explicitly spelled
out in the federal statute. It might even be suggested that since the stan.
dards are dear, there is no valid reason for the jury commissioner to use
54 Compare Brooks v. Beto, 366 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1966). with Labat v. Bennett, 365 F.2d
698 (5th Cir. 1966).
55 See text accompanying notes 45-48, supra.
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any means other than direct communication with those persons whose
names have been taken from directories, voters lists and tax lists. However,
subsequent district court decisions have qualified the thrust of Rabinowitz
along these lines. 6
Of course, even if the broadest latitude is given to Rabinowitz's interpretation of the federal statute, that statute is not applicable to state jury
commissioners who must operate within the scope of their own state's qualification standards, which are often general in nature. Therefore, as long
as the Rabinowitz decision was merely a statutory and not a constitutional
interpretation, any elimination of the key-man system by that decision
would have no present bearing upon the use of that system by state jury
commissioners.
CONCLUSION

As discrimination in jury selection has evolved from the first cases concerning state statutory exclusion through the successive stages of total
exclusion by state agents and token inclusion to the present stage of
substantial but disproportionate representation, the law has struggled to
keep pace. Early consideration of the construction of state statutes gave
way to the procedural concept of requiring petitioner to establish a prima
facie case of intentional human discrimination before requiring respondent
jury board to defend its actions. This quickly led to the demand for more
than general denials from respondents once a prima facie case was established. Jury-book records, census figures, statistical analyses of social, economic and racial factors, and the testimony of jury commissioners, state
officials or federal officials and long-time residents, all became commonplace
factors of the evidence introduced to either prove or disprove discrimination. Finally, in the face of substantial but disproportionate representation,
additional guidelines were created. Petitioner had to prove a disparity
between the percentage of Negro names on jury lists or juries and the
percentage of qualified Negro names in the community. Petitioner was also
required to present more detailed evidence to show that actual discrimination and not chance was responsible for any existing disparity. By 1966, the
problem of jury selection discrimination no longer was as simple as it had
been in 1880.
Against this historical background, the Fifth Circuit decided its six
cases. Whether consciously or not, this court appears to have created new
56 In United States v. Duke, 263 F. Supp. 828 (S.D. Ind. 1967), both the key-man system
and the use of qualification standards higher than those provided for in 28 U.S.c.
§ 1861 (1964) were upheld as valid. While verbally interpreting Rabinowitz to support this
ruling, the district court in actual fact simply refused to follow the Fifth Circuit case.
A similar position has been taken by a district court within the Fifth Circuit. United
States v. Hunt, 265 F. Supp. 178 (W.D. Tex. 1967).
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guidelines for state jury commissioners to follow in their selection of
jurors for their jury rolls. First, the state jury commissioner has a duty to
obtain a jury list fairly representative of each of the classes existing within
his area. To do this, he must ascertain the types of classes present and the
number of qualified persons within each class available for jury service.

Furthermore, he is under an obligation to do everything possible to make
his initial jury list correspond proportionately with the percentage of
qualified persons available in each class as compared with the total number
of qualified persons available in the area. At present, the classes based on
race or color are of primary importance. One constitutionally acceptable
method of preparing this initial list is to include on the list qualified names
on the basis of the class concerned. Additional qualified names should be
obtained from that class when present facts or past history indicates that
other forms of selection will lead to a disproportionate disparity of that
class on the initial list.
If the state jury commissioner actively and repeatedly attempts to gain
qualified class names and is prevented from doing so through the evasive.
ness or uncooperativeness of the class itself, then the jury commissioner
will not be held responsible for the disparity caused. However, the presumption of the court against respondent commissioner upon the establishment by petitioner of a prima facie case of intentional discrimination still
remains. Thus, any "good faith" defense by a jury commissioner will face
close scrutiny and will require affirmative evidence introduced by the
commissioner.
Both to avoid intentional discrimination and to lay a foundation for any
later good faith defense, the jury commissioner should adopt the key-man
selection system or some other approved system which will bring to him
the qualified names of each class in his area. He should take care to follow
the standards required by his state's qualification statutes and to apply

these standards equally against each class within his area. Detailed records
as to each step in the selection system should be kept as needed to insure
effective use of that system under changing conditions within the commissioner's area.
The guidelines outlined above would appear to be part of the present
law concerning jury selection in the Fifth Circuit. Future development
of these guidelines will probably depend upon three factors. One factor
will be the success of the present guidelines in ending intentional discrimination in jury selection systems. The second factor will be the advances made in the technological aspects of present jury selection systems
to insure more complete coverage of areas supplying prospective jurors.
The third factor will be the extent to which the Fifth Circuit will proceed
on an individual trial-to-trial basis to protect parties' and prospective
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jurors' constitutional rights to fairly chosen representative juries. The outcome will undoubtedly be of great interest to both the South and the rest
57
of the nation.
A. C. R. Ill
57 For an excellent recent discussion of the law in this area see United States V.
Tillman, Grim. No. 25009, N.D. Ga., Aug. 3, 1967, which involved an attack on the
constitutionality of a plan by the Atlanta Division of the Northern District of Georgia
to comply with recent jury selection guidelines. The method in question involved taking
every fiftieth name of the voter registration lists of each county in the Atlanta Division.
Each person whose name was drawn was sent a jury questionnaire and the return on
these was roughly fifty-five percent. At this point the only persons disqualified were:
(1) those under 21, (2) those convicted of a felony, (3) those unable to read, write or
understand English, and (4) those with some other infirmity which would prevent clficlent
jury service. This method resulted in 90% qualification of those returning questionnaires and an available jury pool of one half to one percent of the total names on
voter registration lists. According to the 1960 census Negroes constituted 20.48% of the
population 21 and over in the Atlanta Division. This new method further rcsulted in
the inclusion of 15.77% Negro names in the jury wheel. In a well-reasoned opinion
Judge Sidney Smith found (1) there could be no systematic exclusion of Negroes or any
cognizable group or class of qualified citizens represented on the voter lists, (2) this plan
created a "fair sample" and represented an adequate cross section, and (3) the voter
registration list is a proper source for prospective jurors.
The Judicial Conference of the United States, March 30, 1967 concluded that "voter
lists are the best source of prospective jurors." 35 U.S.L. WvE 2592. A description of
the Atlanta Division system has been distributed by the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts to each District in the United States as a recommended solution
to problems raised by Rabinowitz and Whitus. See United States v. Tillman, supra,
at n.10.
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